Colombia's Chamberlain-esque peace?

On the face of it, it seems like a no-brainer. On 02 October Colombians are going to be asked to vote either 'yes' or 'no' for peace. 

That is to say, to give their backing to a deal finally reached between the government and the leftist-styled Farc rebels to end a bloody internal conflict that has troubled the country for over 50 years. Apart from the sadistic amongst us, who wouldn't vote in the affirmative?

President Santos' peace, but not for all Colombians?

Of course, it's just not that simple, even if, perhaps, it should be. You see, there is a belief that what has been brokered by the negotiators in Cuba in many ways doesn't reflect the reality on the ground in Colombia. 

A political agreement that looks fine and dandy on paper and allows the warring leaders to come together in brotherly love (it has pretty much been male-dominated), but a deal practically not worth the paper it's written on in "normal Colombia", the very place it's meant to bring about real, positive change. That's a view you won't have to search hard to find among the masses.

We've written plenty here before about the problems inherent in this process, one of those being the idea that the Farc leaders who negotiated this deal do not speak for the majority under their control (if ‘control’ is the right word to use here at all). 

Indeed, with political positions in the offing for the few Farc dealmakers of Havana, their lives might just be about to become a whole lot easier. The same cannot be said for the foot soldiers.

This is one source of scepticism towards the whole process for Colombians; it's to be found especially among the lower classes and away from the big cities (as we mentioned in a previous post). 

The idea is that those who may fly under the Farc banner today will just continue on in criminality post this peace deal being ratified, if that should happen. 

Plus, you have those who were never Farc members, be they fellow leftists or from the right, who have made a tidy living from both controlling and living in what you could call a separate state from the elected one headed by Juan Manuel Santos. Colombia's black market can be quite profitable.

What's more, there are those, headed vociferously by former president, the hawkish Álvaro Uribe, who view this as Santos' peace, not one that truly represents Colombia at large (el pueblo Colombiano). 

With Santos' approval rating low, a protest 'no' vote is a distinct possibility to add to the other genuine causes for concern that Colombians have about the process.

Most people know that true peace is not going to come with the simple signing of an agreement and a ceasefire. There are a host of deeper obstacles before arriving at a situation where peace and stability can thrive in Colombia. 

At the heart of those is the vast inequality that exists in the country, something that, it appears, no government has been willing or able to pay proper attention to.

That aside, that some of Colombia's men of violence have decided to give peace a chance has to be seen as a positive development, better than the status quo. 

Yes, officialdom was duped before, but a Neville Chamberlain returning from Nazi-run Germany in 1938 with a peace for our time type of agreement this is not. This particular deal has some substance to it. 

For sure, it's far from perfect, but it is a step in the right direction. The hope must be that it is a modicum of peace to achieve more peace.

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The Spy Wednesday Agreement — ominous for Santos?

In conflict resolution, common practice in both academia and realpolitik is to compare different regions that have experienced or are experiencing violent problems. While no two conflicts are exactly the same, broadly speaking there is a common blueprint to follow to go from war to peace.

Dark days ahead for President Santos? (Photo from Facebook.)

In this regard, and as has been written about here before, Northern Ireland's peace process has provided Colombia with plenty of food for thought — in theory if nothing else. 

In fact, Holy Week has been chosen as the defining moment for Colombia's current peace talks, discussions that have been ongoing for three-and-a-half years. It may be just purely coincidental, but you could see it as a nod towards the agreement that signalled a new, more peaceful direction for Ireland, signed on Good Friday (Viernes Santo) 1998 and named after that historic day.

Yet even the day picked by the Colombian government, 23 March, in the English religious vernacular in any case, is somewhat ominous: Spy Wednesday. 

It might be a bit of a stretch to portray President Juan Manuel Santos as Jesus, but it's not stretching it to state that a grand betrayal of the peace deal he seems so desperate to sign may be on the cards; without any miraculous resurrection in the days, months and years to follow.

It comes back to one of those principal points in conflict resolution: that all parties involved see a greater benefit in a new way rather than continuing with the old.

If you look at the Northern Ireland situation in 1998, it's pretty fair to say that the agreement signed promised a better, more "legitimate" life ahead for the main protagonists involved and their cohorts. In contrast, and this has always been the issue, what brighter, legitimate future can be assured for Farc guerrillas should a permanent peace deal be signed?

For the movement's heads, things might improve somewhat; there may even be some political participation, despite the right-leaning nature of the Colombian electorate. 

Yet for the foot soldiers on the ground — and this applies for hard-pressed civilian Colombians, too — the money that can be made from underground activities such as illegal mining and narcotics is far more attractive than anything the state and its foreign helpers can provide.

On top of all this, even if Farc en masse accepted a final peace deal, there is still the question of the other, not-insignificant guerrilla group, ELN. It hasn't been privy to these exact talks, so there's a chance that its hand could be strengthened at the expense of the Colombian state, a process that has already started according to some reports.

Throw in a still present paramilitary element on the other side of the divide that also profits well from illegal trade and it's not difficult to see the huge problems with 'Santos' Peace', as some Colombians call it.

There aren't too many out there who still see this conflict as a simple 'guerrilla left' versus a government and military that are more right of centre, as its origins may have been. It's more complex than that. 

As long as large sums of "easier" money are to be made by illegal methods that neither the national government nor foreign powers seem capable of tackling, a meaningful, lasting peace for Colombia seems a long way off.

A bold new blueprint is needed for conflict resolution here, one that goes well beyond the country's borders.
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Colombia's peace 'impaz'

It’s been expressed here before that I generally go along with the ‘communicate rather than exterminate’ stance when it comes to dealing with human enemies.

This line is practically sacrosanct when the other side is showing a willingness to compromise. 

What’s more, when you have a conflict that has been ongoing for more than a couple of generations, showing scant signs of progress on either side, engaging in talks seems not only prudent but unavoidable.

Both parties to the Colombian peace talks remain in combat. (Photo from Twitter.)

That was basically the case when Colombia’s latest peace talks got underway over two years ago.

However, to say they’ve hit a stumbling block or two over the last few weeks and months is putting it mildly. You could say that this was always a strong possibility given that both the Farc and government forces have remained largely on the offensive; that is to say, there has been no meaningful ceasefire.

The rebels' (Farc et al.) strategy of kidnapping not only combatants but also civilians continued.

Yet, the talks also carried on regardless. Well, they did until the Rubicon – or more precisely a river in the Chocó department – was crossed by Farc in terms of what the government saw as permissible acts throughout this whole process: That being the kidnapping of army general Rubén Darío Alzate.

Saying goodbye: General Alzate. (Picture from Twitter.)

His release after two weeks in captivity and subsequent resignation have meant the passage is clear for the peace talks to move forward again, resuming as they will on 10 December. (The fact that the general in question has admitted he and his companions breached safety protocols in a known red zone in the country is also somewhat of a mitigating factor; “one shouldn’t 'dar papaya', General.”)

That being so, the pessimism that has grown in many quarters over the direction these discussions are taking is understandable.

OK, agreement, we’ve been told, has been reached in both land reform and the rebel’s future political participation should a final deal be sealed, while decent progress seems to have been made on victims’ rights. 

These are three of the six key areas of the talks. The other elements are drug trafficking, rebel disarmament and the implementation of the peace deal itself.

The most infamous of the above sextet, drug trafficking, could no doubt prove to be another major barrier, as mentioned in these pages before.

Chocó: Beautiful, but with dangers.

In that regard, President Juan Manuel Santos caused a stir of late by suggesting drug dealing could be made a political offence and not a criminal one. For him to publicly say it seems to imply that it is being looked at as a potential sweetener for Farc members involved in the trade, however exactly it would play out in practice.

Needless to say, in a country that has suffered more than most due to the illegal narcotics business, not everybody is waxing lyrical about such a possibility.

On a broader, what you might call more abstract scale, there is also the question of who and/or what is Farc? 

In other words, are those doing the guerrilla group’s negotiating in Havana representative of a unified body? It’s difficult to believe they are. But at the very least they represent some warring faction that is tinkering with the possibility of changing its ways.

This process, of course, was always going to be a long one; only the utterly negative or ludicrously positive thought otherwise.

The only certainty, for now, is that there are set to be many more twists and turns before war-weariness wins the day.