'Right you are, Colombia'

There is very often a significant difference between what one might like to see happen and what actually does transpire.

In this regard, in relation to our previous post, lest there be any confusion, we don't expect Humberto de la Calle to be Colombia's next president. As much as we may like what he's about, the majority of the Colombian electorate, those who actually matter in this, don't. Or at least they don't want him as their next president.

Iván Duque: The "right" fit for Colombia (photo from Facebook).

In fact, de la Calle himself more than likely realises he won't be taking up residence at Casa de Nariño.

The man who will be doing that, barring what would amount to a significant sea change in the state of play, is Iván Duque.

It's pretty clear why.

Firstly, in normal circumstances, those who bother to vote in Colombia look to the centre/centre-right when electing their president.

Taking that as a given, there are really only two other serious challengers to Duque: Sergio Fajardo and Germán Vargas Lleras.

Yet, if we are to trust the majority of opinion polls, the country's left, or more socially democratic minded we could say, are behind Gustavo Petro in significant numbers. For many in this bracket, it's Petro or nothing (or certainly not Álvaro Uribe's protégé Duque). 

So this large minority, if they get out and vote, should do enough to get their "messiah" into the decisive second-round vote. The thing is, faced with a split centre-right vote, the Petro ticket does well.

However, in a straight shoot-out against just one, let's say more acceptable candidate for this country, Petro's a losing bet. This is especially so when it's seen as a black-and-white contest, left versus right, as it will be with Duque.

It seems safe to assume that the majority of Vargas Lleras's votes would transfer to Duque. Some Fajardo voters might swing to Petro, but certainly not all of them.

Thus, for the many 'Anybody but Duque/Uribe' Petro voters, their best chance of keeping the Centro Democrático out might be to opt for Fajardo in the first round. That is, try and make it a Duque-Fajardo head-to-head. In that scenario, some more centrist-type voters who wouldn't contemplate siding with Petro might be more inclined to go with Fajardo rather than Duque.

Of course, this sort of tactical, second-guessing voting largely based on opinion polls is risky. It could all backfire.

Nonetheless, regardless of how the others line up, this looks to be Duque's contest to lose.

This brings us on to the broader issue of why Colombia tends to shun anybody with a hint of "left" to him/her when it comes to its president.

The fact that the state has been battling leftist insurgents since the 1950s is a significant factor. 

For this particular election, the murderous activities of Farc dissidents on the Ecuadorian border, the controversial arrest of a high-up ex Farc guerrilla on drug trafficking charges and the stop-start peace talks with a still active ELN reinforce the commonly held view that 'left is bad'. The political and social turmoil in neighbouring "socialist" Venezuela is also playing its part.

Yet, other Latin American countries have had to deal with a violent left without this resulting in such political thinking being pretty much dismissed outright.

One of the differences for Colombia is due to the fact that the state, with significant help from right-wing paramilitaries, systematically destroyed the political left, rendering it no more than an irritant. The discourse has been dominated by the victors, the rightist state and its media friends.

Those on the left are subversives, a threat to the Colombian republic. So the narrative goes anyway.
(It is important to note here that the United Nations estimates that the Farc and ELN accounted for 12 per cent of civilian deaths in the conflict up to 2016, with 80 per cent attributed to right-wing paramilitaries. The government was responsible for the remaining eight per cent.)

Thus, with the recent violent events mentioned above, Colombia's rightist guardians look as appealing as ever to urban dwellers across the stratum divide.

Now is not the time to rock the boat. Better the devil you know guys.
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The Spy Wednesday Agreement — ominous for Santos?

In conflict resolution, common practice in both academia and realpolitik is to compare different regions that have experienced or are experiencing violent problems. While no two conflicts are exactly the same, broadly speaking there is a common blueprint to follow to go from war to peace.

Dark days ahead for President Santos? (Photo from Facebook.)

In this regard, and as has been written about here before, Northern Ireland's peace process has provided Colombia with plenty of food for thought — in theory if nothing else. 

In fact, Holy Week has been chosen as the defining moment for Colombia's current peace talks, discussions that have been ongoing for three-and-a-half years. It may be just purely coincidental, but you could see it as a nod towards the agreement that signalled a new, more peaceful direction for Ireland, signed on Good Friday (Viernes Santo) 1998 and named after that historic day.

Yet even the day picked by the Colombian government, 23 March, in the English religious vernacular in any case, is somewhat ominous: Spy Wednesday. 

It might be a bit of a stretch to portray President Juan Manuel Santos as Jesus, but it's not stretching it to state that a grand betrayal of the peace deal he seems so desperate to sign may be on the cards; without any miraculous resurrection in the days, months and years to follow.

It comes back to one of those principal points in conflict resolution: that all parties involved see a greater benefit in a new way rather than continuing with the old.

If you look at the Northern Ireland situation in 1998, it's pretty fair to say that the agreement signed promised a better, more "legitimate" life ahead for the main protagonists involved and their cohorts. In contrast, and this has always been the issue, what brighter, legitimate future can be assured for Farc guerrillas should a permanent peace deal be signed?

For the movement's heads, things might improve somewhat; there may even be some political participation, despite the right-leaning nature of the Colombian electorate. 

Yet for the foot soldiers on the ground — and this applies for hard-pressed civilian Colombians, too — the money that can be made from underground activities such as illegal mining and narcotics is far more attractive than anything the state and its foreign helpers can provide.

On top of all this, even if Farc en masse accepted a final peace deal, there is still the question of the other, not-insignificant guerrilla group, ELN. It hasn't been privy to these exact talks, so there's a chance that its hand could be strengthened at the expense of the Colombian state, a process that has already started according to some reports.

Throw in a still present paramilitary element on the other side of the divide that also profits well from illegal trade and it's not difficult to see the huge problems with 'Santos' Peace', as some Colombians call it.

There aren't too many out there who still see this conflict as a simple 'guerrilla left' versus a government and military that are more right of centre, as its origins may have been. It's more complex than that. 

As long as large sums of "easier" money are to be made by illegal methods that neither the national government nor foreign powers seem capable of tackling, a meaningful, lasting peace for Colombia seems a long way off.

A bold new blueprint is needed for conflict resolution here, one that goes well beyond the country's borders.
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Colombia's path to peace?

We’re not big fans of hyperbole here and, thankfully, most Colombians appear to be that way too. 

Hence the somewhat indifferent reaction from many locals to the official revelation of what has been one of the worst-kept secrets in recent Colombian politics: President Juan Manuel Santos’s government has had preliminary discussions with the country’s long-standing left-wing guerrillas, Farc.*

El Presidente: Can he really make peace with the Farc?

Depending on whom you speak to, this indifference to the news verges on the slightly optimistic to the pessimistic. One thing’s for sure, you’ll be hard-pressed to find anybody overjoyed that ‘proper, full-scale’ peace talks are in the offing. 

It’s all down to reconciliation weariness really – Colombia has been here before on many occasions. The fact that the Farc is still involved in bombings and kidnappings tells you just how successful those previous attempts at fostering peace went down.

So what, if anything, has changed this time around? Well, of course, there’s a different administration in place intent on ‘learning from the errors of the past’. It’s the very least President Santos and his team could try. He certainly is saying the right things in this regard. 

He made it clear in his state broadcast that the country’s military would remain in 'every centimetre of national territory'. That was an obvious reference to the failed strategy of former President Andrés Pastrana who, in 1999, demilitarised a vast zone in the south of the country to facilitate peace talks with the rebels. 

While negotiations did take place, this buffer zone allowed the Farc to rebuild, recruit and reinforce itself in relative comfort. The legacy of this is still being felt today as it is in this area that the group remains at its strongest.

Now, while Farc may still have strength in its unofficial safe zones, generally speaking it would appear to be at the weakest point in its history. 

It has suffered key military setbacks against the state’s armed forces in the last few years with the recent upsurge in its attacks seen by some as the desperate last kicks of a cornered beast. Sitting down with the government could be its best option right now. Time will tell how sincere the group is about the whole process.

'The Path to Peace': Far from straightforward.

However, as in any peace talks, one must ask the question, can an essential balance be found that would be key to any potential lasting settlement? 

From this remove, it would appear that the government – and, by extension, the vast majority of the country’s inhabitants – has far more to gain. Obviously, if Farc agrees to lay down its weapons and cease attacks that’s good news for all who want peace. 

For Santos, if things go that well so soon, it should do his faltering approval rating no end of good, helping him in his quest for re-election in 2014. 

Peace negotiations have been part of his manifesto – quite apart from his predecessor, the hard-line right-winger Álvaro Uribe who has been very vociferous in his opposition to talking with ‘terrorists’, attacking the current administration’s policy at every opportunity.

A military-defunct Farc is clearly the very least the Colombian government and the majority of the country’s electorate will look for in any agreement. 

In such a scenario, the Farc, in some form, would surely look for political legitimacy and perhaps immunity from prosecution for some or all of its top members. This is looking at it from a political-conflict point of view.

Yet, the days of this struggle being purely about political ideology – if they ever were – are long gone. There is a far more powerful agent at play and it is this that is at the crux of the issue here: the control of the drugs trade. 

For Farc to go legit and allow unrestricted official access to its white-gold territories will be the equivalent of signing its own death warrant – mainstream political presence or not. 

While we might know what comes out of the depths of Colombia’s jungles, what actually happens inside them and exactly where remains about as mysterious as the inner workings of a rugby scrum. And for those working in the illegal drugs trade, that’s the way they want it to remain.

The 'white gold' in its ore form, the coca leaf.

It has been mentioned on these pages before that the current strategy by most elected governments, Colombia included, in tackling the narcotics underworld is not working (see ‘Dealing with the Dealers’: http://bit.ly/NXGLEl). 

Calls for a new front in this war, however, are gathering pace, not least in Latin America (Santos himself has spoken of the need for a new approach), a land that knows more about this issue than most. 

Take the illegal drugs trade out of subversives’ hands and their power and wealth are greatly reduced. In fact, for most underworld operators, their raison d’etre practically disappears.

So while there will be much focus on the political manoeuvring in the upcoming dialogue between the Colombian government and Farc (with the ELN, the country’s second-largest rebel group, indicating it also wants to be part of this process) the weight afforded to the drugs issue will be interesting to see.**

You can only ignore the white powdered elephant in the room for so long before it starts blowing in your face.

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* Farc stands for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in English.
** ELN stands for Ejército de Liberación Nacional or National Liberation Army in English.

For another article on a related theme, see: ‘Dangerous Colombia Part II’ http://bit.ly/OyCBRS